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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
cases above, the decisions of the courts have more and more tended
to retreat from the free-speech protection first announced in the
Thornhill case. Although the West Virginia court indicated in the
Blossom Dairy and Ohio Valley Advertising cases that it felt it was
strictly bound by the earlier Supreme Court holdings and, there-
fore, picketing had to be protected as an element of free speech, it
is submitted that if the question were to arise today the court could
feel free, if it wishes, to follow this indicated trend away from free
speech and toward unlawful purpose as the test of the propriety of
an injunction against peaceful picketing.
E. W. C.
THE "F~mGE AE" oF Puimic UTmrr=TE
The United States Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois' took the
first, and a very important, step in establishing a new concept of
public utilities when, on sustaining state rate control of the grain
industry, the court recognized that it is the facts that make a busi-
ness a public utility, not legislation. This decision was followed by
a series of decisions which not only firmly entrenched this concept,
but established a "fringe area" of regulated industry; an area wherein
a business "affected with a public interest ... is subject to control
for the public good".2 The day has long passed in which there re-
mains any question of the power of the government and the courts
to regulate such industries "affected with a public interest." How-
ever, there are three questions remaining in relation to such indus-
tries: (1) the extent of the regulation in the "fringe area"; (2)
what rights the "fringe area" industries have to protection that
private industries do not have; (3) when does a private industry
enter the "fringe area?".
When radio saw the light of day in 1920 the operators sub-
mitted to regulation under the Radio Act of 19123 which had been
passed by Congress to regulate point to point wireless operators.
The introduction of radio brought forth a new problem, that of
electrical interference. Regulation of license permits was under
I Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
2 Nebbia v. State of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), wherein the court
said: "We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted
sense of the phrase, a public utility." At 531. (Italics ours.)
337 STAT. 302 (1912), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-54 (1928).
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the supervision of the Secretary of Commerce, however, it had
been decided before 1920 that the secretary could not establish any
conditions precedent or exercise any discretion in issuing a license.4
Also, under the act of 1912 a "hands-off" policy as to competition
among operators had been adopted. The problem of electrical
interference was forestalled by the broadcasters agreeing to observe
certain restrictions imposed by the secretary. Voluntary submission
was doomed from the beginning and soon radio stations began to
interfere with other stations' broadcasts. Finally, in 1926, it was
decided in the United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.5 case, and in
another opinion by the attorney general,6 that the Secretary of
Commerce was not vested with the power to regulate time limits,
operating power, or to designate the frequency band that a broad-
caster might use.
In 1927, Congress, to rescue the radio industry from the re-
sulting chaos, passed the Federal Radio Act.7 This act established
the Federal Radio Commission and gave the commission the power
to issue and revoke licenses under the standard of public interest,
convenience and necessity. Immediate concern and controversy
developed as to the commission's power to revoke licenses. Section
148 of the act allowed the commission to revoke a license if (1) the
licensee failed to provide reasonable facilities; or, (2) made unjust
or unreasonable charges; or, (3) had been guilty of unjust dis-
crimination. This section precipitated the argument by many that
Congress had classed radio broadcasters as common carriers through
an application of the historical concept of the duties of common
carriers.9 This argument was countered with the claim that con-
gress had not intended to class radio broadcasters as common car-
riers since the act did not regulate rates. The commission took the
stand that section 14 applied only to point-to-point operators because
at common law the radio broadcasters had not been classed as com-
mon carriers since there was not a "holding out to serve all." Under
the act of 1927 the issue of the degree of protection afforded exist-
ing licensees arose in the case of FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge.
Co.,10 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the com-
429 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 579 (1912).
5 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. I. 1926).
635 Ops. ArT'Y GEN. 126 (1926).
744 STAT. 1162, 47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927).
81d. at 1168, 47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927).
9 See WYmAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (1911).
10 289 U.S. 266 (1933). The case decided the court's authority on review
which is not within the scope of this note.
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mission in increasing the power of one station and revoking the
license of another station, saying that those who have operated a
station have no right superior to the commission's power to regulate,
and that any investment by the broadcaster was made subject to
this power of the commission. It was obvious, then, by the end of
1938 that neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Radio Com-
mission considered a radio station as a common carrier or public
utility, but preferred to treat it as an outer "fringe area" industry.
By 1934 a new danger had developed in the radio field, that
of network control of the various stations, this danger coupled with
the popularity of "trust-busting" led Congress to pass the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.11 This act was significant in the field of radio
regulation in that it omitted section 14 of the act of 1927, and ex-
pressly provided that a radio broadcaster was not a common car-
rier;12 and secondly, it gave the commission the power to refuse a
license to a petitioner who had been convicted of violating the anti-
trust laws.13 The second of the above gave the commission a new
ground on which to formulate license policy and one which led to
the present day "multiple ownership rule",' 4 for the commission at
once claimed that this gave it the authority to consider competi-
tion and the danger of monopoly in formulating its licensing policy.
The United States Supreme Court in the Pottsville Broadcasting
Company15 case upheld the commission on this point, saying that
Congress in enacting the act of 1934 moved under the widespread
fear that in the absence of governmental control the public interest
might be subordinated to .monopolistic domination in the broad-
casting field. It is obvious that by now the commission had adopted
a new role in the field, and in this role it was supported by the
Supreme Court. Where, originally, Congress had designed radio
regulation to prevent electrical interference, the commission had
assumed the position that it was to protect the public from monopo-
listic control of news dissemination by radio broadcasting. The
adoption of this approach distinctly nudged the industry closer to
the public utility zone, deeper into the "fringe area." Also, although
the act of 1934 had expressly stated that radio broadcasters were
not to be classed as common carriers, terminology commonly asso-
1148 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1937).
12 Id. at 1066, 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(h).
13 Id. at 1086, 1087, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 311, 313.
1447 C.F.R. § 363(a)(1) (1953).
15 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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ciated with a public utility, "that regulation was to be for the public
interest, convenience, and necessity," was used as the guide for
the commission in its regulatory activities.
Still lingering in the background was the issue of an existing
licensee's right to protection from economic loss caused by the
issuance of a license to a new station to operate in the same area
as the existing station. The commission steadfastly maintained that
it regulated in the public interest, that it was not to consider private
interest. The issue was brought to the attention of the United States
Supreme Court in the Saunders Bros. Radio16 case, decided in the
same year as the Pottsville case. The Sdunders Bros. case on its face,
indicated a distinct trend away from the public utility zone. In this
case the commission issued licenses to both applicants to serve in
the same area, Saunders Bros., one of the applicants who had been
broadcasting in the area, appealed from the commission's ruling
contending that the commission had not considered the danger of
economic injury to the appellant in issuing the second license. The
Supreme Court upheld the commission's ruling saying that under
the act the commission was not required to consider the danger
of economic injury to an existing licensee in granting a license. As
strong as the decision appeared to be on its face as pulling the
industry away from the public utility zone, the court was thinking
in public utility terms when it said that the commission would have
to consider "ruinous competition." This is evidenced by the court's
statement: "This is not to say that the commission will not consider
competition where it will have a vital and important bearing on
the ability to serve."'u The court then went on to distinguish the
difference between mere economic injury as such, and the case
where the competition would result in both stations "going under"
thereby depriving the public of the service it deserved. The case
indicating the possibility of an application of a principle that had,
for the past few years, been battling for recoguition in the public
utility field.'8 It is true that the above was only a dictum but it
is submitted that it was a recognition of the public utility aspect
of the radio industry. Apparently, the court, in reaching the above
16 FCC v. Saunders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
17Id. at 476.
18 Hardman, The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service, 33 W.
VA. L.Q. 219 (1927), Another Word, 34 id. at 123 (1928); opposed to the
author's view is same title, Arnold, A Dissent, 34 id. at 183 (1928), with a fur-
ther comment by Mr. Hardman, 34 id. at 290 (1928).
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result, was considering the radio industry in much the same light
that the court had looked at the milk industry in the Nebbia case.
The problem of economic harm and protection of existing
licensees has always been of great concern to the commission for
it was early asserted by such licensees that this was sufficient
grounds for intervention in a license hearing. Existing licensees
claimed that failure to allow them to intervene on the basis of eco-
nomic harm and the subsequent issuance of a license to a new
station was a denial of due process. This was refuted in Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage case, in which the court had held that a
radio license was not a property right. This was not to be the
complete answer though, for the Communications Act of 1934 pro-
vided the right of appeal to a person "aggrieved or whose interests
are adversely affected by the commission's orders." The Supreme
Court, in the Saunders Bros. case ruled that a person suffering eco-
nomic injury would be a person aggrieved or whose interests were
adversely affected and could appeal from the commission's orders.
It is to be noted that this phrase does not distinguish existing li-
censees from newspaper owners or others. Enter the possibility that
a newspaper, subjected to harmful competition by the commission's
awarding a radio station license, would be protected on appeal.
What had started out to be a narrow field of protection from elec-
trical interference had slowly developed to a field with unending
possibilities. In 1942 the Supreme Court enlarged on this point,' 9
when it upheld an order, granted by a district court, staying a
license issued by the commission. Here the court held that, although
the persons given the right to appeal by the communications act
must stand as representatives of the public interest, and that in
such a case the court is called upon to enforce public rights, this
does not diminish its power to protect private rights. The danger
of economic harm to private interests was recognized as grounds
to order a rehearing by the commission. The effect being to re-
quire the commission to allow intervention in the first instance and
to bring to the forefront the effect of competition by the prospec-
tive licensee.
By the time that television entered the scene the radio indus-
try stood on the threshold of the public utility zone. It was still
a "fringe area" industry but obviously recognized as an industry
19 Scripps Howard Radio v. Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). The issue was
the validity of a district court's issuing the order staying the issuance of a license
by the commission pending an appeal by an existing licensee.
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so affected with the public interest that the Supreme Court had fore-
seen the danger of ruinous competition. Television automatically
came under the jurisdiction of the communications commissions.
20
The introduction of television was the entry of a third medium of
news dissemination and enjoyment in a field that had been occupied
only by newspapers and radio. But, more important, it introduced
a new industry which to sustain itself had to draw from the existing
industries' source of revenue, the advertiser-a new source of com-
petition in a field that did not have too much room for compe-
tition. Where in 1940 at the time of the Saunders Bros. case,
ruinous competition was not a pressing danger, with the advent
of television, its development and consequent locating of stations
in the smaller towns throughout the nation, competition among the
three now took on a new hue. The effect of this upon the commis-
sion and upon the courts' thinking began to show at once.
Heretofore the newspaper industry had escaped regulation and
had been accepted as a private industry,21 the few cases in which
newspapers had entered into the FCC's area of authority having to
do with situations wherein the newspaper sought a license to estab-
lish a radio station. Fortunately or unfortunately, the foundation
had been prepared for intervention by newspapers to protest the
issuance of a radio license on the ground of economic loss. A facet
of this foundation was apparent in a case decided in 1950.22 The
case is distinguishable from prior cases in that a publisher who was
seeking a radio license had resorted to unfair practices in his news-
paper in regard to an existing licensee. The commission refused
his application and was upheld by the federal court of appeals on
the ground that monopoly in the communication of news and ad-
vertising is contrary to the public interest. The decision is impor-
tant as prior court decisions had applied this principle to the situa-
tion where the radio broadcasting field was in danger of monop-
olistic control; this decision applied this principle to the field of
news and advertising service as a whole, without any distinction
as to the method.23 Prior to this case the point in issue was that
of news dissemination. The court in the Mansfield case recognized,
2048 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(b) (1937).
21 In re Louis .Wobl, 50 F.2d 254 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1931); Uhlman v.
Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225 (1920).
22 Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
23 See Associated Press v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1944). Here the
court, in a dictum, had said that monopolistic control of news dissemination by
newspapers was to be avoided in the public interest.
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and rightly, the importance of the advertising service which the
three industries render to the public. It would seem that this case
indicates a tendency to possible acceptance of all three industries
as public utilities.
Again in 1955 the seriousness of the problem created by the
entry of television into the advertising field and its effect on the
court was borne out in the case of Metropolitan T.V. Co. v. FCC.
24
In this case the petitioner, as an existing licensee, was denied the
right of a hearing in a license case. On appeal, the appellant con-
tended that the commission's action granting a new license in the
same area, to another television broadcaster, would cause a loss
of listeners and would thereby impair its competitive position with
a newspaper in the same city. The federal court of appeals held
that this was sufficient showing to classify the petitioner as a party
in interest and to entitle the party to a hearing. The commission
was ordered to rehear the case, although the two stations were
sufficiently far apart to prevent any competition or electrical inter-
ference with each other.
The stage was now set for the latest, and probably the most
significant case in this field, Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC.25
In this case the protestant was a newspaper publisher, not an existing
licensee; nor was the protestant seeking a license. The petitioner
owned stations (radio and television) in a neighboring city and also
newspapers in nine cities in the same state. The license application
had been opposed by a radio broadcaster, who withdrew from the
case on the petitioner's paying its, expenses incurred in protesting.
Clarksburg Publishing Co. immediately entered a protest. The
commission recognized Clarksburg Publishing Co. as an interested
party but went on to award the petitioner a license without an
evidentiary type of hearing.26 On appeal, the court remanded the
case to the commission for an evidentiary hearing, to allow the
protestant to come forward with its evidence. The protestant had
entered the case on the basis that to grant a license in the city would
result in direct competitive injury to him. The court and the com-
mission recognized this as sufficient grounds to allow Clarksburg
Publishing Co. to enter a protest, as a party in interest, since both
the television station and the newspaper rely on advertising as a
main source of revenue. The court also went on to discuss, and in
24221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
25 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
26 66 STAT. 715, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(c) (Supp. 1955).
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part base its holding, on the fact that the petitioner had a monopoly
in certain areas of the state in relation to news dissemination through
ownership of the newspapers.27 The significance of the case lies in
the recognition of the protestant, a newspaper, as an interested
party purely because to grant the license could result in economic
harm to it since both mediums rely on the same sources for revenue.
Also, the decision carries the Mansfield decision a step further since
in the Clarksburg Publishing Co. case the question of monopoly in
the newspaper field did not arise on any question of unfair practices
on the part of the petitioner. It is true that the court did not hold
that the commission could not award a license to the television
operator in such a situation. If the issue of monopoly was absent,
however, the classing of the publisher as a party in interest, with
a right to protest, purely on the basis of economic harm, indicates
that the court stands ready to protect the investment of a broad-
caster or newspaper owner when such investment is endangered due
to competition brought about by the entry of television operators.
How much closer could the court move to recognition that the facts
have brought the three industries to a point where they stand tot-
tering on the dividing line between full-blown public utility status
and the "fringe area?"
Clearly, the commission can, by application of the above prin-
ciples, prevent monopolistic control of the news and advertising
dissemination mediums in a certain locale. In the large metropolitan
areas this will not be of too great consequence as in those areas
there is sufficient revenue to support them. The problem becomes
acute in the smaller communities where, generally, the revenue is
not sufficient to support all three. One must be aware that in such
cases the policy of the commission and the court against monopoly
in news and advertising service is bound to conflict with their policy
of protecting the existing licensees and publishers, the former policy
demanding separate ownership, the latter policy being conducive
to single ownership.
The courts have led the three industries down a long road until
today they stand at a crossroads. One road means full public utility
status while the other means a treading of the dividing line between
that and the "fringe area." The side road of private industry has
long been passed. To prophesy which way the three will turn would
27The court commented strongly on the petitioner's paying the original
protestant's expenses, indicating that to be acceptable, the commission should
require a detailed statement of the expenses.
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be sheer conjecture at this time. However, the tendency is seem-
ingly toward the public utility side. In considering the future trend,
one must remember that the Supreme Court forty-one years ago
said: "There must be progress, and if in its march private interests
are in the way they must yield to the good of the community."28
J. W. P.
ORAL CoNuTcrs TO DEVISE AND BEQUEATH IN WEST VIRGINIA
Undoubtedly the rule prevails in a majority of jurisdictions in
the United States that a contract whereby a person obligates himself
for a valuable consideration to make a provision by will is not illegal
or against public policy.' West Virginia is in accord with this general
rule with regard to contracts to devise or bequeath which satisfy
the general requirements of a contractual relationship.2
When an attempt to contract to devise is made orally however,
the promisee in attempting to gain equitable relief or damages at
law is faced squarely with statutory barriers which at first blush may
appear insurmountable.
In an attempt to secure relief in equity upon an oral contract
to devise the proponent in West Virginia is met by not one, but
four separate statutes which appear to bar performance of the oral
contract. The Code requires that, "no estate of inheritance or free-
hold or for a term of more than five years . . . shall be created or
conveyed unless by deed or will."3 This statute when read in con-
junction with those which explicitly require that,"... no will shall
be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator. . -4 and
"no contract for the sale of land . . . for more than one year shall
be enforcable unless the contract or some note or memorandum
thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby,
or his agent,"5 as well as that requiring that; "no action shall be
brought in any of the following cases:
28 Hadachuck v. Sebastian, 289 U.S. 894, 410 (1915).
1 AEnmsoN, Wnis § 48 (2d ed. 1953); PAGE, WILLS § 1707 (3d ed.
1941).
2 Davidson v. Davidson, 72 W. Va. 747, 79 S.E. 998 (1918).
3 W. VA. CODE C. 86, art. 1, § 1 (1931).
4Id. c. 41, art. 1, § 3 (1931).
5 Id. c. 36, art. 1, § 3 (1931).
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